In this contribution, I move away from my usual focus on economic issues to set the stage for the dramatic shift in geopolitical risks in the Middle east following the collapse of the Assad dynasty in Syria
The warp speed turn of events in Syria brings to mind a quote by Hemingway. When asked how he went bankrupt, he said: “Gradually, and then suddenly”. The sudden demise of the Assad regime was not on the radar in a region already wracked by violence and war, but it will have significant consequences on the region’s geopolitical risk landscape. In turn, the outcomes and possible scenarios will be shaped by the winners and losers of the demise of the Assad dynasty. The main winners are Turkey, and to a certain extent the Saudis, while the main losers are Iran and its allied militias and Russia. The outcome for Israel should be ambiguous.
Iran: Iran, which had seen its regional position weaken in the past months, is now suffering from the complete collapse of its “axis of resistance”. Hezbollah has been to a large extent dismantled and Hamas has been severely weakened. The loss of its key ally, Assad’s Syria, is the final blow. Not only the “Shi’ite crescent” is being dismantled, but the next regime is Syria will be dominated by hardline Sunnis with an unrelenting hostility towards Iran for its decades-long support of the Assads. Furthermore, the loss of Syria will result in the further isolation and marginalization of Hezbollah. Finally, the Houthis, never a major factor, will be under pressure to make a deal with the Saudis. If there are winners in Iran, it will be the Iranian people and society, which have always shown their opposition to the Islamic Republic’s support of Syria, Hezbollah and other foreign actors. Furthermore, the collapse of the IRI’s regional foreign policy could reinforce the position of the more moderate President Pezeshkian at the expense of the hardliners, offering some relief from the repression for a long-suffering society
Russia: Vladimir Putin has been humiliated, and his military forces in Syria are under threat of encirclement. Losing its foothold in Syria could mean the end of its naval and military presence in the Mediterranean.
Turkey: President Erdogan has played a complex game in the region over the past few years. He has supported some of the opposition groups to Assad, such as the HTS, while at the same time trying to contain the Kurds to the northeast of the country. In any case, the close relations that Turkey has developed over the years with the main opposition groups, as well as its membership in NATO, put the country in a unique position of influence in determining the future of Syria.
Israel: For Israel, the impact fall of Assad is ambiguous. On one hand, it will help further marginalize Iran and the Hezbollah group and isolate Hamas further. On the other hand, Israel had learned to co-exist with Syria over several decades, with an implicit understanding of red lines. Whether Syria ends up with a unified and strong government or collapses in chaos, the country will have to deal with hard-line Sunni adversaries across its northern border. The losers continue to be the Palestinians and the people of Gaza, whose plight seems to be forgotten in the midst of the regional turmoil.
Saudi Arabia: the country has strengthened its regional position. Firstly, Iran had already taken major steps to repair its relations with the Kingdom, and a weakened Iran is more likely to seek a further improvement of relations, hoping that Saudis can serve as reliable intermediaries between Iran and the United States. Secondly, he Saudis may now be able to pressure the Houthis for a lasting solution to the Yemen problem.
The United States: the incoming Trump administration will take office facing multiple crises and challenges. The changing balance of power in the region will offer it a unique opportunity to engage Iran in serious negotiations. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, Iran’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs and currently President Pezeshkian’s main national security advisor, called for in-depth negotiations with the United States. At the same time, according to the International Atomic Agency, Iran has dramatically boosted its production of 60% uranium, underscoring its progress towards nuclear-grade enrichment. However, we must recognize that there are serious obstacles to a successful outcome of such negotiations, assuming they even happen. First, while Iran’s economy desperately needs relief from the harsh sanctions regime, the conflict between hardliners and pragmatists has yet to be resolve. Second, the Trump national security team is untested and has a steep learning curve. Furthermore, it already has its in-box full with Ukraine and Israel-Gaza, not to mention China, NATO and other hot-wire issues. Finally, it will face continued pressure from the Israeli government dominated by the extreme-right to any normalization with Iran.
Once the euphoria of victory is over, the Syrian players will have to deal with the challenge of rebuilding of a shattered country. The major Arab states, Turkey, the United States and the Europe have a major stake in helping to build a stable functioning state in Syria. At the same time, the main players in the region are reassessing their game, exploring new opportunities and measuring new challenges. How they leverage these new opportunities remains key. Stay tuned.
Very thorough, thank you.